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Truth and Consequences: Political Judgment  
and Historical Knowledge in  
Foucault and Althusser
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Abstract: This article considers the connections between Foucault’s work and Althusser’s ideas in 
the early 1970s, when Foucault was delivering the lectures that would result in the publication of  
Discipline and Punish in 1975.  The central claim is that Foucault’s critique of  the rationalist aspirations 
of  the Althusserians, especially with regard to knowledge of  the past, is inextricable from his effort to 
articulate a political alternative to their work.  But in targeting the Althusserians’ pretensions to yield 
something like “true ideas” about economic exploitation, Foucault deprives himself  of  a sound episte-
mological base in which to ground and orient his own political judgments.  Various ambiguities ensue, 
relating not least to Foucault’s obscure relationship to neoliberalism in the last years of  his career.
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“As is well known, the accusation of  being in ideology only applies to others, 
never to oneself  (unless one is really a Spinozist or a Marxist, 
which, in this matter, is to be exactly the same thing).”
– Louis Althusser, 19701
Michel Foucault’s mentions of  Spinoza are few but inconsistent.  Rumor has it he 
requested a copy of  Spinoza’s Ethics on his deathbed.  Years earlier, in 1971, he turned to 
Spinoza at the climax of  his exchange with Noam Chomsky to add authority to his claim 
that, when the proletariat seizes power, it will be because it can and wants to, not because the 
action is just.  The primacy accorded to power over anything recognizable as right, in a liberal 
sense, is an abiding feature of  Foucault’s work from the early 1970s onward.  And it’s true 
that one of  the most provocative elements of  Spinoza’s political thought was his rendering 
of  power and right co-extensive in the pages of  the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.  These 
affinities between Foucault and Spinoza are suggestive, which makes the role Spinoza plays 
in the Lectures on the Will to Know from 1970–71 all the more surprising.
In these lectures, Foucault begins to develop in earnest the notion of  genealogy as a 
method for unbinding the relationship between knowledge and truth.  Nietzsche is the 
protagonist in this effort:
But Spinoza is the adversary since, from On the Improvement of  the Understanding to the last 
proposition of  the Ethics, he is the one who names, founds, and renews the affiliation of  truth and 
knowing in the form of  the true idea.  […] Spinoza is for Nietzsche the philosopher par excellence 
because he is the one who links truth and knowledge in the most rigorous way.  To avoid the trap 
of  Kant one has to kill Spinoza.  One will escape the critique and the old Chinaman of  Königsberg 
only by having undone that affiliation of  truth and knowledge to which Spinoza has the right to 
give his name, since it is he who thought it from end to end—from the first postulate to the final 
consequences (LWK, 27).
 1 Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of  Capitalism (London: Verso, 2014), 265.  Hereafter 
cited as “R” in the main text.  Note that citations of  Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses: Notes towards and Investigation” will be to this edition, 232–272.  Other texts will 
be cited in line as follows.  Michel Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know: Lectures at the Collège 
de France, 1970–71, ed. Daniel Defert et al. (New York: Picador, 2014) = LWK; Idem., The Punitive 
Society: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1972–73, eds., François Ewald, Alessandro Fontana, 
and Bernard Harcourt (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015) = PS; Idem., Psychiatric Power: 




Foucault rightly perceives that for Spinoza truth is foundational, a primitive concept.  “The 
true is its own sign, and that of  the false.”  If  truth is primary, all else is effectively entailed by 
it.  “Truth is thus nominated,” Foucault says, “as that which founds knowledge as well as the 
desire to know.  It is on the basis of  the truth that all the other elements are set and ordered” 
(LWK, 24-5).  Foucault notes that Spinoza’s work accomplishes an overturning of  Aristotle. 
But we can also see how his own project will attempt an overturning of  Spinozism.  For 
Foucault, truth is anything but foundational.  It is itself  derivative, a consequence of  power. 
It is, above all, an effect and in no way a cause.
Spinoza speaks often of  the “true idea,” and rarely of  truth as such.  Semantics aside, 
it’s clear that Spinoza nevertheless exemplifies the classical age that is central to Foucault’s 
historical schema.  To be sure, he garners virtually no mention in The Order of  Things.  But 
the comments in Lectures on the Will to Know show that, for Foucault, Spinoza’s thought is 
representational in the sense described in his archaeology of  the human sciences.  A “true 
idea” is representational to the extent that it corresponds to the object it is an idea of; it is a 
matter of  agreement (convenientia) between an idea and its object (ideatum).  By contrast, 
an “adequate idea” is one determined as such by its internal structure.  In this sense, true 
ideas figure in what we commonly recognize as correspondence theories of  truth, whereas 
adequate ideas find an analogue in coherence theories.  But the point is that each type of  idea 
grounds the other, truth and adequacy are in some sense co-constitutive.  Foucault was atten-
tive to this form of  mutual constitution.  One of  the distinguishing traits of  Foucault’s work 
was that it did not treat Spinoza as an anomalous figure in the history of  philosophy, but as 
an exemplary or emblematic one.  This is why Kant—the “Chinaman of  Königsburg”—is 
engaged in a project continuous with Spinoza’s, not departing from it.  The image of  “Man” 
as an “empirico-transcendental doublet” dealt with at length in The Order of  Things is 
another variation on the curiously dual nature of  truth as a founding instance and object of  
discovery—what allows us to know and what we will come to know—in the image of  God 
or Substance in Spinozism.
Indeed, the circle of  truth and knowledge described in Spinoza’s thought in the 1970 
lectures is not unlike that figured in Las Meninas.  It is a signifying process that at once 
presumes and disavows its own outside.  In The Order of  Things, the status of  the represen-
tational is ambivalent.  With Foucault, it is not always easy to tell what theoretical figures he 
laments or applauds, and there is a sense in which he seems to yearn for certain features of  
the classical age.  Yet with the work of  the early 1970s, culminating in Discipline and Punish, 
it seems clear that representational schemes of  thought are not valorized.  They are patently 
inadequate to a thinking of  power in the late modern and contemporary era.  This is the 
normative content of  Foucault’s historical schema—an adequate thinking of  power ought 
to be formally analogous to the forms power takes in the age in which it is thought.  Hence 
there is a historical intelligibility to the representational schemes that Hobbes and Spinoza, 
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for example, produced in an age when absolutist power was largely a matter of  spectacular 
representations of  authority.  It’s not so much that they were wrong; it’s that the nature of  
power, as historically ramified and mutable, has itself  changed, so their theories might not 
be correct now.
The recusal of  representation is a guiding thread of  the 1972–73 lectures, The Punitive 
Society.  Foucault rejects the focus on exclusion and transgression found in earlier writings, 
seeking to develop a method in which “it is no longer a question of  the law, the rule, the rep-
resentation, but of  power rather than the law, of  knowledge rather than representation” (PS, 
6).  His focus will now be on tactics.  By looking at power as a set of  material arrangements, 
as tactics, Foucault avoids a situation in which events and forms are treated as representa-
tions or manifestations of  a power that exists prior to them.  “In other words, I would like to 
approach these tactics as analyzers of  power relations, and not as revealers of  an ideology.” 
(PS, 12).  The problem with an analysis that treats State apparatuses as localizations of  
power is not so much in the localization itself, but in the fact that the method of  analysis is 
representational.  Power is bodied forth in the apparatus and the task is a hermeneutic one of  
getting behind the representation to understand the connection, the ideology that gives the 
apparatus its role and content.
The concept “representation” is in this way linked to “expression,” which is also deni-
grated in Foucault’s writings of  the same period.  Near the conclusion of  his 1973 Rio 
lectures, “Truth and Juridical Forms,” he remarks as follows:
[W]e cannot situate the human sciences at the level of  an ideology that is purely and simply the 
reflection and expression, in human consciousness, of  the relations of  production.  If  what I have 
said is true, it cannot be said that these forms of  knowledge [saviors] and these forms of  power, 
operating over and above productive relations, merely express those relations or allow them to be 
reproduced.  Those forms and knowledge and power are more deeply rooted, not just in human 
existence but in relations of  production.2
If  representations express the truth of  what they represent, this is precisely the mechanism 
that Foucault seeks to call in to question.  Likewise, apparatuses are not material representa-
tions of  a power relation that is antecedent to them.  In the later lectures on Psychiatric Power, 
he is even more emphatic in his rejection of  the notion of  “State apparatus” for being much 
too broad and incapable of  taking the microphysics of  power into account.  It is worse than 
inadequate; it actively leads us down false trails: “If  we look for the relationship between 
discursive practices and, let’s say, economic structures, relations of  production, I do not think 
 2 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms,” in Idem.  Power, eds., James D. Faubion and Paul 
Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 2000), 87.
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we can avoid recourse to something like representation, the subject, and so on, appealing to a 
ready-made psychology and philosophy” (PP, 13).
The structural analogy between forms of  knowledge and forms of  power is crucial to 
Foucault’s thinking here.  In both cases, the form is isomorphic to that found in Spinoza’s 
notion of  the “true idea,” as Foucault understands it.  The true idea represents truth, which 
means one either accepts the truth as unproblematic, i.e., one grants the representation a cer-
tain authenticity, or instead one embarks on an effort to understand if  and how the represen-
tational mechanism works.  How is it, precisely, that truth is expressed in the true idea?  How 
is it, precisely, that power is expressed in the State apparatus?  Such queries are central to 
the entire project of  critique, in the Kantian and post-Kantian sense.  This is the significance 
of  Foucault’s claims in Lectures on the Will to Know that in order to avoid Kant one first has 
to dispense with Spinoza.  “Spinoza is the condition of  Kant.  One can avoid Kant only after 
having freed oneself  from Spinoza.  Naivety of  the skeptics, of  the neo-Kantians, of  Kant 
himself, who thought he could escape Spinoza through the critique.  Naivety of  those who 
thought they could escape the idealism of  philosophical discourse by resorting to Spinoza” 
(LWK, 28).
*         *         *
This last naivety belongs to the Althusserians.  If  there’s any doubt about whom the 
gesture targets in this lecture, it is removed by the repeated references in the following years 
to the conceptual poverty of  the “State apparatus,” in either its repressive or ideological 
incarnations.  Indeed, when read as a whole, Foucault’s lectures of  the early 1970s betray a 
kind of  obsession with the Althusserian project as the latest avatar of  Marxist authority and 
knowledge.  In the early lectures, Foucault uses some marxisant language, and even grants 
State apparatuses a kind of  functional reality.  But by the time of  Psychiatric Power, the con-
cept of  the discrete apparatus has been all but obliterated in a dispersed array of  technolo-
gies and practices.  Appareils are increasingly out of  play, replaced by dispositifs.
This article is part of  a collective effort to consider the relationship between Althusser’s 
conception of  ideology and ideological state apparatuses and Foucault’s concept of  power/
knowledge in light of  the publication of  the early 1970s lectures.  Its strategy is as follows. 
First, it is important to recognize that Foucault’s objections to Althusser’s work on ideology 
are deeply tied to the mechanism of  representation and the concept of  truth it presupposes. 
This is why I’ve begun with an extended effort to establish the structural analogy between 
the power/apparatus relation and the truth/knowledge relation, wherein the latter expresses 
the former in each case.  But the second and arguably main point is this: Foucault’s rejection 
of  this framework is not simply a theoretical corrective.  It is the central move in his effort to 
develop a mode of  historical analysis that would not be a form of  political judgment in itself.
KNOX PEDEN
38
In a word, Foucault seeks to de-politicize the account of  history grounded in the concept 
of  the “mode of  production” on offer from Althusser, while retaining many of  its relational 
and structural components.  It goes without saying that a purposive effort to de-politicize an 
opponent’s account is itself  a political gesture.  What’s specific to Foucault’s attempt—and 
what I mean by calling this effort one of  de-politicization—is his hope to produce a histori-
cal account that is, if  not objective, then at least neutral, and that would thereby allow us to 
rethink politics not as a matter of  contestable judgments in which questions of  truth and 
falsity are unavoidable but instead as a matter of  taking up and occupying various positions 
within a distributional network that is constantly in flux.  This is the meaning of  Foucault’s 
notorious remark that we still not have beheaded the king in theory.  The peculiarity of  
Marxists is that they’ve replaced the king with the authority of  their own historical episte-
mology.  If  we keep our eyes focused on the political nature of  Foucault’s intervention over the 
early 1970s, one of  the enigmas of  his silent dialogue with Althusser in these years becomes 
salient.  As several commentators have noted—Etienne Balibar, most emphatically—the 
Marxist account that Foucault targets in these lectures seems conspicuously like the vulgar 
framework that was the object of  criticism in Althusser’s own work.3  To be sure, Foucault 
had no access to the full manuscript, later published in French as Sur la réproduction, whence 
the famous Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses essay (henceforth, “the ISA essay”) 
was pulled.  But a comparison with the ISA essay in the form in which it appeared in La 
Pensée in 1970 is enough to suggest that Foucault handled Althusser’s positions in a manner 
as puzzling as it was cavalier.
The handling is less puzzling if  we consider that the finer points of  relational, material 
analysis are hardly at issue.  What matters is the politics, and the political stances that an 
Althusserian analysis of  the past warrants in the present.  Althusser’s goal in these years 
was to develop a materialist account of  exploitation that continued to grant primacy to 
economic relations as the generator of  inequality, yet that posited the political sphere—the 
place then and now occupied by the state—as the site in which actions that could alter the 
economic sphere needed to take place.  Foucault rejects this vision of  localized power in the 
state, which concentrates and represents politically the truth or reality of  the economy, itself  
a cipher for the mode of  production.  What troubles Foucault in the Althusserian vision is 
the idea that a faction of  political actors could occupy the State apparatus and refashion it 
to more just ends.  This faction would think itself  in possession of  the “truth,” which would 
serve as the pathway to the “just.”
Foucault regards such an eventuality as consistent with the authoritarianism of  the 
 3 See “Lettre d’Étienne Balibar à l’editeur du cours” in Michel Foucault, Théories et institutions 
pénales, Cours au Collège de France, 1971–1972, eds. François Ewald, Alessandro Fontana, et 
Bernard E. Harcourt (Paris: Seuil, 2015), 285–89.
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human sciences that have sustained power throughout the modern age.  Here again, some 
comments in his exchange with Chomsky—which took place during the delivery of  the 
1971–72 lecture course Théories et institutions pénales—seem pertinent.  There, Foucault 
criticizes any vision of  justice that borrows its forms from the milieu in which such agitation 
emerges.  For example, he suggests that the communist utopia articulated by the Bolsheviks 
is effectively a bourgeois utopia (decent workday, free time, safe and contented family unit…) 
The implication is that communism in its Soviet form is not an alternative to liberal forms of  
domination but an exacerbation of  them.  The rejection of  Althusserianism follows suit to 
the extent that its political aims are confined by the same horizon.  A case could be made 
that Foucault’s judgment of  Althusserianism is unjust, in that he fails to appreciate that 
rescuing Marxism from Stalinism and its legacy was the prime goal of  Althusser’s effort. 
Such is not my aim here.  Instead, I want to focus on two aspects of  the theoretical relation 
between Althusser and Foucault in order to sharpen our vision of  the political differences 
between them.
In the first instance, I’ll argue that the concept of  power at work in the ISA essay and 
related writings is essential to a vision of  politics based in an appeal to facts of  the matter, 
which entails the possibility that one can be right or wrong in one’s judgments about the 
relations of  production and their functional role in a given political unit.  In a word, one can 
have a true idea about exploitation.  Described in this way, this position is precisely what 
troubles Foucault and Foucauldians.  But my aim will be to show that the contrastive vision 
of  power on offer from Foucault is one in which political judgment goes by the board.  One 
can always disagree with Althusser, which is to his credit.  The descriptive analyses on offer 
from Foucault are motivated in part by an effort to render the idea of  political judgment and 
hence political disagreement inapplicable to historical interpretation.
The second point concerns the canonical relation in Marxism between the means of  
production and the relations of  production.  Nearly all of  Foucault’s allusions to Marxist 
grammar focus on the latter: the relations of  production.  One never hears mention of  the 
means and who owns them, or the natural world as a kind of  limit to what can be manip-
ulated and exploited in the production process.  By contrast the distinction and relation 
between means and relations of  production was not simply central to Althusser’s corrective 
to Stalinism.  It was central to the concept of  ideology developed in the ISA essay.  In light of  
Althusser’s ideas, I want to suggest that Foucault’s conceptual indifference to the means of  
production results in a failure to distinguish between the means and relations of  production. 
The obliteration of  any distinction between means and relations of  production is not coinci-
dentally central to the project of  neoliberalism and is given its starkest form in the concept 
of  “human capital.”  I’ll conclude with the suggestion that an Althusserian prism sheds new 




I. Labor and Labor-Power, State and State Power
Foucault’s critique of  power in the liberal and Marxist visions (the Hobbesian and 
the Althusserian) is that it is too monolithic and that it treats power as a substance to be 
held, transferred, or lost.  This suggests that Foucault regards power above all as a relation, 
whereas his opponents treat it as a kind of  essence.  Foucault’s critique of  an essentialist 
vision of  power—that there is one kind of  power, manifested in myriad forms—has a certain 
attraction to it.  But it is hard to see how his own conception is any less essentialist, albeit 
in a logical rather than a metaphysical sense.  There must be some unifying feature of  the 
phenomenon of  power that allows the concept to be applied in myriad instances, even if  such 
a feature is functional rather than substantial.
In his 28 March 1973 lecture, where he more or less explicitly demarcates his project 
from Althusser’s along four theoretical schemas, Foucault begins by challenging the idea 
that power is something one possesses.  He writes: “There is a class that possesses power: the 
bourgeoisie.  Certainly, the formula: ‘such a class has power’ has political value, but it cannot 
be used for a historical analysis” (PS, 228).  This apparently anodyne qualification is in fact 
fraught with implications because it suggests that an operational distinction can be main-
tained between historical analysis and political judgment.  If  the Althusserian perspective is 
factional and thus blinkered, the Foucauldian one on offer aims to be purely descriptive and 
more comprehensive.  Again, the conjecture becomes more definitive in the following year’s 
course: “[P]ower is never something that someone possesses, any more than it is something 
that emanates from someone.  Power does not belong to anyone or even to a group; there is 
only power because there is dispersion, relays, networks, reciprocal supports, differences of  
potential, discrepancies, etcetera.  It is in this system of  differences, which have to be ana-
lyzed, that power can start to function” (PP, 4).  Gilles Deleuze appreciated the full import of  
such pronouncements when he drew out the political implications of  Foucault’s effort: “Now, 
what does it mean to speak for oneself  rather than for others?  […] It’s a matter of  naming 
the impersonal physical and mental forces that you confront and fight as soon as you try to 
reach a goal, and only becoming aware of  the goal in the fight itself.  In this sense, Being 
itself  is political.”4
“Being itself  is political.” If  power is to be local but never isolated, if  it is never a 
discrete entity, then it is truly a phenomenon of  an ontological order.  There is an ambiguity 
in Foucault’s relationship to the idea of  the local.  Power normalizes, and thereby imposes 
homogeneity.  But it also individuates.5  It is everywhere, but it is only ever local.  Foucault 
categorically rejects the totalizing perspective for being too captive to a logic of  expression; 
 4 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972–1990, trans.  Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995), 88, translation modified.  Idem., Pourparlers, 1972–1990 (Paris: Minuit, 1990/2003), 121.
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the focus on dispersal and non-unified arrays is an effort to articulate a countervailing per-
spective.6  It is well known that Althusser rejected Hegelian totality for the same reason.  So 
what, then, is really at stake in their different conceptions of  power?
The ISA essay contains a crucial distinction between the State (or State apparatus) and 
State power, which is completely unremarked in Foucault’s work of  the period.  Foucault 
treats the concept of  power in Althusser’s essay in essentially substantialist terms.  But it 
seems clear that for Althusser power is already regarded as essentially relational, and a 
specific kind of  relation at that.  For Althusser power is a purposive relation; it is actualized 
intentional action.  The concept of  State power in the ISA essay finds an analogue in the 
concept of  labor power as it is articulated and defended in Reading Capital.7  To be sure, the 
terms are different.  Arbeitskraft becomes force de travail in French, whereas the power that 
is Althusser’s concern in the ISA essay translates pouvoir.  But the ambiguity between Kraft 
and Vermögen (force and pouvoir) as it applies to the faculties runs through the Kantian 
project, culminating in the third Critique.  In all cases, the question is one of  capacity or 
capability, also sometimes conceived of  as potentiality.  Most abstractly there is the analytic 
need to distinguish between what the thing is and what the thing does or can do.  State and 
labor are relationally comprised unities that we come to know via the kind of  analysis Marx 
offers in the Grundrisse.  In this sense, as things, they are abstractions.  State power and 
Labor power are the capacities such unities possess and are in nowise abstract.  In Reading 
Capital, Althusser takes his cue from Marx’s critique of  classical political economy for its 
failure to distinguish between labor and labor power, that is, its failure to distinguish the raw 
material that is labor from the intentional relation that orients it to specific tasks, i.e., labor 
power.  Labor power does not exist in the abstract, but only in actualized purposive relations. 
It concerns not necessarily what is, but what can be done in any given situation.  It is a con-
cept essential to any description of  an action as opposed to a mere event and thus endows the 
relations of  production with their intelligibility.8
A similar relation is in play in the distinction that Althusser draws between state and 
state power in the ISA essay.  The state and the state apparatuses in both their repressive 
and ideological guises are material forms.  They are a kind of  raw material, whether as brute 
 5 See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of  the Prison, trans.  Alan Sheridan 
(New York: Vintage, 1995), 184.
 6 See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975, eds. Valerio 
Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni (New York: Picador, 2003), 50.
 7 Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans.  Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1997), 
20–21; 165–181.
 8 I develop this line of  argument more fully in “Against ‘Alienation’ (Or: How to Orient Oneself  




physical forces or an array of  nominally social and discursive practices.  But what is their 
source of  power? How do they work?  What endows them with pouvoir?  “Let me clarify one 
important point: the state (and its existence in its apparatus) has no meaning except as a 
function of  state power.  The whole of  the political class struggle revolves around the state” 
(R, 241).  Althusser comes to this claim after a critique of  what he calls “a descriptive theory 
of  the state,” in which this essential distinction between state and state power is obscured. 
We can read this is a critique of  Foucault’s position avant la lettre, not least because Foucault 
often wears the “purely descriptive” as a badge of  pride.  Such descriptive theories were 
criticized under the banner of  empiricism in For Marx and Reading Capital.  The core of  
the Althusserian project, abstractly stated, was to make visible a fundamental distinction 
between matter and relation that inheres in matter itself  and that the capitalist mode of  
production renders obscure.  Capitalism wants to deal with labor alone; it does not see the 
distinction between labor and labor power that makes the exploitation of  surplus value pos-
sible.  The indistinction is made possible by an ideology that keeps everything in its place 
and suggests that the motor of  such relations is a smooth, natural functioning rather than 
a political conflict.  Ideology naturalizes; it makes it difficult to see situations as political 
consequences.  There is a vision of  Althusser’s ideology not unlike Foucault’s pouvoir/savoir 
as something essentially oppressive and ineradicable.  But Althusser clearly states how ISAs 
come into being and how they might be changed.  He notes that the predominant ISA in mod-
ern capitalism is the educational apparatus (as opposed to the Church in the medieval period). 
But this is no mere epiphenomenon emergent from a fixed material.  Rather, “the dominant 
ISA of  mature capitalist social formations is a result of  a violent political and ideological 
class struggle” (R, 249).
By insisting on the centrality of  class struggle, Althusser makes relations of  exploita-
tion into facts that must be explained with reference to political decisions and actions.  By 
rendering power fully immanent in material forms themselves, Foucault eliminates the dis-
crepancy between State and state power—or labor and labor power—that allows us to see 
power as a purposive relation.  Foucault’s appeals to the concept of  “civil war” are an attempt 
to avoid this framework.  The conflict doesn’t express a discrepancy; the conflict simply is 
the discrepancy.  To be sure, Foucault’s criticism of  the Althusserian alternative is motivated 
by the suspicion that one could never be in possession of  the knowledge of  what “actually” 
lies behind such relations.  But since, for Althusser, such relations are neither natural, nor 
ontological, but exhaustively political in the first place the criticism is wide of  the mark. 
Althusserian science doesn’t tell you what to do (to the frustration of  many Marxists, in and 
outside of  France).  It is a means rather for distinguishing between situations that can be 
explained in fully naturalized, empirical accounts and those that require an appeal to politi-
cal conflict and hence ideology in order to be rendered intelligible.  Relations of  exploitation 
are just those kinds of  situations.  But when Foucault sees exploiter and exploited as simply 
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two poles in the ontological phenomenon that is power, he deprives us of  the means, not for 
making a claim about injustice, but for seeing which way the power relation goes as a fact of  
the matter, a fact that is intentional and purposive in its content.  This incidentally is what 
would hypothetically distinguish Althusser from Chomsky.  A good Kantian, Chomsky relies 
on deontological appeals to universal justice.  Althusser is more concerned to give a robust 
epistemological account of  how we recognize exploitation when we see it.  Justice is to be 
decided on the political battlefield.  (Foucault has never sounded more Althusserian than in 
his debate with Chomsky, which perhaps accounts for the favorable take on Spinoza in this 
setting.  The contrast between these remarks and the condemnation of  Spinoza in the Collège 
de France lecture a few months before makes for a genuine puzzle; perhaps it is yet another 
indicator of  the context-sensitivity of  Foucault’s thought and utterances.)
By making ideology central to political intelligibility, as the set of  “imaginary” relations 
one maintains to the relations of  production (“the real conditions of  existence”), Althusser 
elevates and embraces the ideological status of  his own work.  This is what’s at stake when 
he observes: “as is well known, the accusation of  being in ideology only applies to others, 
never to oneself  (unless one is really a Spinozist or a Marxist, which, in this matter, is to be 
exactly the same thing)” (R, 265).  In a sense Foucault thinks Althusser is captive to ideol-
ogy—the ideology of  ideology, as it were.  But for Althusser ideology is essential to political 
judgment.  The concept is essential to being able to distinguish between natural phenomena 
and political phenomena.  This is also the distinction in play between the “means of  produc-
tion” and “relations of  production,” as the component parts of  the core political concept of  
Althusser’s effort: the “mode of  production.”
II. Means of  Production versus Relations of  Production
The critique of  Stalinism that runs through Althusser’s work treats the Soviet disaster 
as consequent on an overweening emphasis on the means of  production as the key to over-
coming alienation, to establishing utopia.  In this vision, politics is directed toward achieving 
a maximal extraction of  labor power from labor regarded as a kind of  natural form, along-
side the natural material that labor transforms.  In this setting, the distinction between labor 
and labor power is forsaken, just as it was in classical political economy, and exploitation 
continues under other ideological forms.  The task in the aborted manuscript, recently trans-
lated in English as On the Reproduction of  Capitalism, is to think about how reproduction 
works in all instances—how the means of  production and productive forces are reproduced 
on the one hand, and how the relations of  production are produced on the other.  In Reading 
Capital, productive forces held a kind of  bridging position.  They were something more than 
mere means, and thus part of  the relations of  production.  But as forces in the strong sense 
they were also amenable to materialist analysis.9  The first English translation of  Reading 
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Capital contains a glossary prepared with Althusser’s approval.  Here “mode of  production” 
is defined as a concept whose content comprises the relation between two complex unities, 
viz. the productive forces and the relations of  production, each of  which comprises in turn 
a relation among three units they share between them: the laborer, the means of  production, 
and the non-laborer.10  The finer points of  these interconnections partly explain why Reading 
Capital, a work of  exegesis, is so attractive an object of  exegesis for its enthusiasts.  But the 
goal of  Althusser et al.’s effort is clear enough.  It is to challenge the sense that either nature 
or the means of  production alone—all the putatively pure material elements—are sufficient 
to account for the structure of  the mode of  production and the politics of  class struggle.  The 
heretical claim comes through; a genuinely materialist analysis errs when it focuses uniquely 
on the materials.  If  the economic base turns out to be inextricable from the political super-
structure, then a focus on the nominally material base alone is inadequate.  The aim is not to 
abandon the base for the superstructure, but to gain insight into the relation between them 
and the complex unity they form.
Althusser’s work in On the Reproduction of  Capitalism attempts more clarity, but, as 
we know, he was himself  dissatisfied with the results.  In this volume, the productive forces 
still serve a bridging function, but they are defined effectively as the combinatorial result 
of  means of  production and labor power.  In this they are analytically contrasted to the 
relations of  production, where we see ideology as the paramount concern.  The theses on 
ideology are designed to account for how the relations of  production are reproduced, which 
is to say how labor is constantly directed away from access to the state as the site in which 
the relations of  production might be transformed.  In Althusser’s view, the events of  May 
1968 were not encouraging in that they seemed to redirect, yet again, the focus of  political 
contestation to questions of  personal expression and overcoming alienation.  In a word, they 
concentrated attention on means—individuals conceived as discrete subjects; natural units 
in some sense—rather than relations.
In these developments, Althusser saw political struggle becoming unmoored from the 
economic base.  His challenge was to continue to emphasize the practical primacy of  the polit-
ical sphere (already a heterodox gesture within Marxism) with the material or foundational 
primacy of  economic inequality.  In other words, “the paradox is that, in order to destroy the 
class relations of  capitalist exploitation, the working class must seize bourgeois state power, 
destroy the state apparatus, and so on, because the state is the key to the reproduction of  
 9 See in particular Balibar’s remarks: “[T]he ‘productive forces’ are not really things.  If  they were 
things, the problem of  their transport, their importation, would, paradoxically enough, be easier 
to resolve for bourgeois sociology […].  But from a theoretical point of  view, the ‘productive forces’, 
too, are a connexion of  a certain type within the mode of  production; in other words, they, too, are 
a relation of  production” (Althusser and Balibar, Reading Capital, 235).
 10 Ibid., 317.
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capitalist relations of  production” (R, 127).  Althusser elaborates this point as follows:
The economic class struggle, which cannot by itself determine the outcome of  the decisive battle 
for the socialist revolution, that is, the battle for state power, is not a secondary or subordinate 
struggle.  It is the material basis for the political struggle itself.  Without bitter, uninterrupted, 
day-to-day economic struggle, the political class struggle is impossible or vain.  There can be no 
concrete political class struggle capable of  carrying the day that is not deeply rooted in the eco-
nomic class struggle, and in it alone, because the economic class struggle is, to hazard a somewhat 
metaphorical expression, the base, determinant in the last instance, of  the political struggle itself, 
which is for its part—for such is its function—the only one that can lead the popular masses’ 
decisive battle.  Primacy of  the political class struggle, then; but this primacy will remain a hollow 
phrase if  the basis for political struggle, the economic class struggle, is not waged daily, indefati-
gably, profoundly, and on the basis of  the correct line (R, 129-30).
Althusser’s worry is that a political struggle that does not keep its focus on economic exploi-
tation has no means for orienting itself  in practice.  His Marxism is an ideological anchor, 
but it is explicitly ideological.  And the core of  this ideology is to maintain the distinction 
between the means and relations of  production, to continue to speak a Marxist grammar that 
allows one to see a distinction between natural forms that can be manipulated within limits 
and relations that must be sustained or challenged in no holds barred political struggle.
This distinction acquires a new urgency if  we apply it to the exchange that took place 
between François Ewald and Gary Becker in 2012, moderated by Bernard Harcourt.  The 
occasion was Foucault’s ambiguous comments on Becker’s work in The Birth of  Biopolitics 
and in particular on the forms of  knowledge attendant to the concept of  “human capital.” 
In Becker’s remarks, capital seems to play a role not unlike power for Foucault.  It is what 
unifies a field of  action, but it can take myriad forms.  “Yes, human capital is capital,” Becker 
observes, “but it’s a very different form of  capital.”11  What distinguishes it, it turns out, is 
its limited mobility, the kinds of  investment it requires, etc. Certain norms have changed 
since the days of  serfs and slaves.  “If  I invest in my human capital, I cannot in modern 
societies use my capital as collateral to borrow loans.”  Becker applauds Foucault’s sugges-
tion that human capital is like machinery, but again he insists on subtle differences between 
human capital and other forms.  The fact is there is nothing subtle about the concept at all. 
Whatever the distinctions harbored in the qualifier “human,” to speak of  human capital is 
 11 Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt, “Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker,” 
American Neoliberalism and Michel Foucault’s 1979 “Birth of  Biopolitics,” Institute for Law and 
Economics Working Paper no. 614.  (Chicago: University of  Chicago Law School, 2012), 22.  Cf. 
Daniel Zamora and Michael C. Behrent, eds., Foucault and Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2016).
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again to speak of  human labor and labor power indistinctly as means of  production.  It is 
to develop a theoretical analysis that excises any role for the relations of  production as sites 
of  political determination, preferring instead to regard the world as an array of  means to be 
organized according to maximally efficient ends.  Efficiency is indeed the normative keynote 
of  Becker’s remarks in this exchange.12
There appears to be a theoretical similarity at work in the ontological flattening involved 
in Foucault’s account of  power and pouvoir-savoir and his later dalliance with neoliberalism 
and the concept of  “human capital.”  Beyond the formal similarity, such a development is 
consistent with Foucault’s historicism, which seeks always to think power in the forms that 
it takes in a given moment.  So to think neoliberal ascendancy, barely underway in the 1970s, 
means thinking its forms of  power.  But it also risks thinking in such a way that eliminates 
the possibility of  forming a set of  political judgments and courses for action that would 
counter such a tendency.  Neoliberalism is not the result of  an array of  anonymous events 
and dispersals.  It is the result of  political decisions undertaken largely by state actors work-
ing in an international arena.
But to be able to re-describe these historical developments as political events means 
making contestable truth claims about the actions involved.  This is what Mitchell Dean and 
Kaspar Villadsen are getting at when they write: “Perhaps a provocative move by contem-
porary governmentality and post-Foucauldian studies and poststructuralists more broadly 
would be to combine their deconstructivist analysis with forms of  knowledge that, in imme-
diate opposition, claim to speak the truth about society, mapping patterns of  inequality and 
documenting the effects of  precarity.”13  This goes against the Foucauldian ethos in a funda-
mental way.  In the introduction to Psychiatric Power, Arnold Davidson speaks of  a rumbling 
that takes place on the micro-physical level, in local power relations amidst questions of  con-
duct.  “It is this rumbling, this maelstrom of  battle that Foucault’s perspective renders visible, 
a struggle that is effaced in a purely epistemological analysis and that is left out of  sight within 
a theory of  power built on a juridical and negative vocabulary” (PP, xvii, emphasis added). 
Epistemology is deemed out of  play; it is what obscures the more fundamental rumble that 
is the ethical heart of  political contestation and that is memorably deployed at the end of  
Discipline and Punish.  But without claims to know something about relations of  production, 
there can be no viable development of  a political strategy that would be designed to change 
them.  Althusser’s commitment to the Spinozist notion of  the true idea was essential to his 
 12 Ibid., 19.
 13 Mitchell Dean and Kaspar Villadsen, State Phobia and Civil Society: The Political Legacy of  Michel 
Foucault (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 177, emphasis added.  Cf. Julien Pallotta, 
« L’effet Althusser sur Foucault : de la société punitive à la théorie de la reproduction » dans Marx 
& Foucault : Lectures, usages, confrontations sous la diréction de Christian Laval, Luca Paltrinieri, 
et Ferhat Taylan, Paris : La Découverte, 2015), 129–142.
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effort to claim to know something about relations of  production and the sites of  their poten-
tial transformation.  Foucault’s rejection of  the “true idea” in turn and its “ready-made” reli-
ance on an outmoded representational scheme has little to do with the theoretical content of  
Spinoza’s philosophy or Althusser’s for that matter.14  It is rather a means for delegitimizing a 
certain conception of  political contestation that would be based in dispute over relevant facts.
In the end, there are no objective criteria by which one could judge whether Althusser’s 
or Foucault’s theoretical frameworks give a better or more adequate conception of  the past. 
But what does seem clear is that Foucault’s denial of  relations of  production as primary in 
any sense, political or otherwise, is not a matter of  empirical disproof  or a demonstration of  
theoretical inconsistency.  It is rather a denial that is political in its essentials, which means 
that any critical take on Foucault’s writings and lectures of  the 1970s—the years in which 
the Foucauldian concept of  power was forged—will bear an unavoidably political character 
as well.
 14 Foucault’s gloss on Spinoza’s “true idea” is not without its own ready-made character.  What Spinoza 
means by truth remains an ongoing concern.  For a state of  the art overview, see John Morrison, 
“Truth in the Emendation” in Yitzhak Melamed, ed., The Young Spinoza: A Metaphysician in the 
Making (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 66–91.
